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THE SELECTIVE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATIONS IN CREATING RIGHTS
ENFORCEABLE THROUGH § 1983 ACTIONS
Abstract: For over 125 years, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has provided a means for
plaintiffs to bring a cause of action against any person acting under color
of state law who deprives them of their rights. Since the U.S. Supreme
Court expanded § 1983 to encompass remedies for violations of rights
secured by federal laws, federal circuit courts of appeals have disagreed
whether federal agency regulations, in addition to federal statutes, can
create rights enforceable under § 1983. This Note explores this debate, as
well as the Court's treatment of federal regulations and the evolution of
the Court's approach to recognizing individual rights under § 1983. This
Note argues that those regulations that create cognizable rights, that
possess the full force and effect of law, and that deserve judicial deference
should be eligible to create § 1983 interests. This Note also argues that
both our modern administrative state and public policy considerations
support the derivation of § 1983 interests from federal regulations.
INTRODUCTION
The 2003 decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Save
Our Willey v. Sound Transit refreshed the debate among federal circuit
courts of appeals over whether federal administrative agency regula-
tions may create rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 Section
1983 provides a mechanism for individuals to bring causes of action
against any person acting under color of state law who violated their
rights. 2
 Although the statute alone does not create substantive federal
rights, it provides a private remedy to individuals for the actions of
state officials that deprive them of rights that already are established.s
Until 1980, claimants could only bring § 1983 actions for violations of
constitutional rights. 4 The U.S. Supreme Court then expanded § 1983
to encompass remedies for violations of federal laws. 5
1 335 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2003); see infra notes 121-194 and accompanying text.
2
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
3
 See id.
See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
5 See id.
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The current controversy among federal circuit courts of appeals
focuses on whether § 1983 should include remedies for violations of
rights created by federal administrative agency regulations. 6 Congress
has delegated the ability to create regulations to federal administra-
tive agencies.? Although courts recognize regulations as carrying vary-
ing degrees of validity and weight, the Supreme Court has not ruled
on whether Congress intended regulations, as a class, to create inter-
ests that can be used as grounds for § 1983 actions. 8 As § 1983 suits
allow individuals to safeguard their federal rights against actions of
the state, the resolution to this controversy will determine whether a
host of new regulatory rights can be recognized and preserved
through private enforcement. 9 If a multitude of federal agency regula-
tions could create rights enforceable under § 1983, plaintiffs would
enjoy far greater protection than if such rights could only find origin
in federal statutes. 1 ° For example, if federal Medicaid regulations af-
forded recipients the right to certain grievance procedures before the
termination of their benefits and a state Medicaid plan failed to pro-
vide such a process, a recipient under the state plan would be able to
bring a § 1983 action against officials of that state. ]] If regulations
could not create rights enforceable under § 1983, however, the right
to such grievance procedures would need to be directly articulated by
statute for a plaintiff to sue under § 1983. 12
Beyond the potential that this debate has to restrict or to expand
the application of § 1983, broader constitutional and administrative
law issues are at stake." If regulations can create § 1983 rights, some
courts are concerned that this will have the capacity to erode the
power of statutes and will assign authority that Congress never in-
tended regulations to possess." Alternatively, if regulations are pro-
hibited from creating § 1983 interests, some courts are concerned
6 See infra notes 121-194 and accompanying text.
7 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 372 (1989); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (citing Morton is Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
See infra notes 23-120 and accompanying text.
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); infra note 258 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 258-260 and accompanying text.
See Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 996 (11th Cir. 1997); Samuels v. District of Colum-
bia, 770 F.2d 184, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
12 See Harris, 127 F.3d at 996; Samuels, 770 F.2d at 188.
13 See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 438 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Save Our Virlky, 335 F.3d at 939; id. at 954-60 (Berzon, J., dis-
senting).
14 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 438 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 939.
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that this will minimize the role that administrative regulations play in
the modern administrative state despite the increasing reliance that
Congress necessarily must have on federal agencies. 15 Ultimately, this
controversy is demonstrative of problems that the judiciary encoun-
ters in attempting to preserve a delicate balance between reserving
lawmaking authority for Congress while simultaneously recognizing
the validity and necessity of the modern administrative state. 1 °
Part I of this Note reviews the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of
federal administrative agency regulations during the past sixty years."
This Part identifies different methods that the Court has used to meas-
ure the weight and import of regulations."' Part II traces the historical
application of § 1983 and the evolution of the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to preserving individual rights under § 1983. 19 Part III examines
the current controversy among the federal circuit courts of appeals
over whether federal administrative agency regulations can create
rights enforceable under § 1983.20 Finally, Part IV argues that the re-
quirements for statutes to create rights and for courts to accord respect
to certain regulations provide stringent tests that should reveal those
regulations that have the potential to create rights enforceable under
§ 1983. 21 This Note argues that those regulations that create cognizable
rights, that possess the full force and effect of law, and that deserve ju-
dicial deference should be eligible to create § 1983 interests. 22
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
REGULATIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court long has monitored the amount of
authority possessed by regulations of federal administrative agencies."
In 1944, in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the Supreme Court declared a
method of determining the amount of respect due to agency rulings
15 See Save Our thlley, 335 F.3d at 954-60 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
16 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 438 (O'Connor, J„ dissenting); Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 939;
id. at 954-60 (Berzon, J„ dissenting).
17 See infra notes 23-81 and accompanying text.
is Sec infra notes 23-81 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 82-120 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 121-194 and accompanying text.
21 Sec infra notes 195-284 and accompanying text.
22 Sec infra notes 195-284 and accompanying text.
25 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,234-35 (2001); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-44 (1984); Chrysler Corp. v. grown,
441 U.S. 281,301-03,312-15 (1979); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,140 (1944).
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and interpretations.24 Since that time, a sequence of more recent Su-
preme Court cases have simultaneously preserved and expanded
upon this method. 25 The result is a legal patchwork of approaches
that guides principles of modern administrative law. 26
hi Skidmore, the Supreme Court held that the nature and weight of
an administrative agency's rulings determine the degree to which
courts should defer to the agency's interpretations of a statute. 27 In the
case, workers sited their employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 (the "FLSA") for failing to provide overtime compensation for
overnight on-call services. 28 An administrator of the Department of La-
bor's Wage and Hours Division, however, issued interpretive rules indi-
cating that time spent on-call at night did not qualify as working time
for the purposes of the FLSA. 29 The Court determined that although
the interpretations that the administrator issued could serve as an in-
formed judgment, they were non-binding and should not control a
court's interpretation of the FLSA's provisions." In arriving at this deci-
sion, the Court formulated a three-part test that determined the weight
that courts should assign to such an administrative judgment. 31 First,
courts should consider the thoroughness of the agency's consideration
of the issue. 32 Next, courts should examine the validity of the reasoning
contained within the interpretive document." Finally, courts should
evaluate the interpretative pronouncement's "consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements."34 The degree to which agency interpretive
rules satisfy these elements will determine how much respect and per-
suasiveness courts will afford them."
Although in 1983, the Supreme Court would take up the issue of
assigning deference to agency rules, in 1979, in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
the Court ruled on a closely related matter when it created an innova-
tive multi-factorial measure for assigning authority to administrative
24 Sec 323 U.S. at 140.
25 See Mend, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44; Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301-
03,312-15.
26 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44; Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301-
03,312-15; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
27 323 U.S. at 140.
"Id. at 135.
" Id. at 137-38.
5° Id. at 140.
51 Id.
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. regulations.38 The Court in Chrysler considered a government contrac-
tor's challenge, under the authority of the Freedom of Information
Act, of the government's requirement that the contractor disclose em-
ployment information.37 The Department of Labor's Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs promulgated regulations that required
the contractor to furnish such information. 38 In assessing the legitimacy
of these regulations, the Court determined that regulations may have
"the force and effect of law" if they satisfy a three-part test." First, regu-
lations must fit the Administrative Procedure Act  (the "APA")
definition of "'substantive rules" rather than "'interpretive rules, gen-
eral statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice."4° Using the standard established in 1974, by the Supreme
Court in Morton v. Ruiz, the Court noted that a substantive rule "`af-
fectisl individual rights and obligations."" Second, Congress must
grant the requisite authority to the agency to promulgate the rule. 42
There must be some "nexus" between the regulation and congressional
legislative authority." Likewise, regulations must not exceed limitations
set by Congress." Third, the agency must follow congressional proce-
dural requirements when promulgating regulations.45 Those proce-
dural requirements, prescribed by the APA, contain the minimal ele-
ments to which substantive regulations must conform. 46 Agencies that
issue regulations by affording notice to interested parties and permit-
ting them an opportunity to comment prior to the creation of regula-
tions have satisfied the APA's procedural requirements. 47
In 1983, in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., the Supreme Court articulated a measure of according deference
to agency regulations by holding that if a statute is silent or ambigu-
ous about its meaning and implications, courts should defer to the
36 Sec Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44; Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301-03.
37 441 U.S. at 286-87.
38 Id. at 286.
36 Id. at 301-03. For the origins of the phrase "force and effect of law," see Batterton v.
Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977), cited in Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 295 n.18; U.S. DEP'T or
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE. ACT 30 n.3
(1979).
4° Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b) (3) (A), 553(d) (1974)).
41 Id. at 302 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974)).
92 Id,
43 Id. at 304.
44 Id. at 302.
43 Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 303.
46 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 313.
47 See s U.S.C. § 553; Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 313, 316.
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appropriate administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of that
statute." The case involved judicial review of an Environmental Pro-
tection Agency ("EPA") interpretation of the term "'stationary
source'" as included in the Clean Air Act Amendments of l977. 49 The
EPA defined the term "'stationary source'" in a manner that led envi-
ronmental advocates to bring this suit in hopes that the judiciary
would review and reject the EPA definition." Justice John Paul Stev-
ens's majority opinion offered a two-step judicial review process of
administrative agency interpretations of congressional acts." First,
Justice Stevens identified the need for the reviewing court to deter-
mine whether Congress directly addressed the issue that the agency
interpreted.52 Administrative agencies and courts must always defer to
congressional speech on any question at issue because such speech is
indicative of congressional intent." If Congress, however, has not spo-
ken to the question at issue because it has written ambiguously or re-
mained silent on a precise issue, the Court declared the second ana-
lytical step to be an examination of whether the administrative agency
has offered a permissible construction of the statute." In this analysis,
courts must defer to reasonable administrative agency interpreta-
tions.55 The Court's rationale for this deference was that Congress in-
tentionally leaves gaps and ambiguities within statutes so that it either
explicitly or implicitly may delegate the task of policy development
and rulemaking to federal administrative agencies. 56
Given this analytical framework, the Court in Chevron proceeded to
look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, and deter-
mined that it was not conclusive as to the meaning of the term "station-
ary source."57 The Court then examined the legislative history to comb
for congressional intent and found it "unilluminating."56 Confident
that Congress failed to address directly the meaning of the term, the
Court declared the EPA's interpretation of "stationary source" a "rea-
48 467 U.S. at 842-44.
49 Id. at 839-40.
5° See id.
51 See id. at 842-44.
52 Id. at 842.
55
 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
54 Id. at 843-44.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 1d, at 859-62.
56 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862-64.
20041	 Regulations Creating 1983 Enforceable Rights 	 189
sortable accommodation of ... competing interests." 56 The Court thus
granted deference to the EPA's interpretation of the term because
Congress delegated regulatory authority to EPA administrators, who are
experts in the field of environmental safety, rather than to judges. 6°The
Court recognized potential criticism that the Court should not defer to
interpretations of administrative agencies that are not held politically
accountable for their actions.61 In anticipation of this criticism, the
Court noted that the President, as head administrator, remains politi-
cally accountable for the entire system and is entitled to make policy
choices to resolve conflicting interests of Congress 6 2
 Thus, the Court
held the EPA's definition of "stationary source" to be a permissible con-
struction of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 63
In 2001, in United States v. Mead Carp., the Supreme Court rein-
troduced the Skidmore measures for courts to use in analyzing admin-
istrative agencies' interpretations of statutory language apart from the
test in Chevron." Mead involved regulations created by the Secretary of
the Treasury that permitted the U.S. Customs Service to issue a ruling
letter categorizing certain imports subject to tariff. 65 An importer
challenged a ruling letter, contending that the Customs Service im-
properly categorized certain imports and, therefore, that the imports
should not be subject to tariff. 66
 Justice David Sower offered the opin-
ion of an eight justice majority, which held that, in determining the
scope of the category of imports subject to tariff, the Court would not
grant the Customs Service's ruling letters the same amount of defer-
ence as the notice and comment regulations at issue in Chevron.67 The
Court observed that the substantial degree of deference that the Chev-
ron Court afforded an agency regulation can only be the consequence
of both congressional intent that an agency possess the authority to
promulgate regulations that carry the force of law and an agency's
proper use of such authority in issuing regulations.66 Congressional
intent to give such authority is embedded in an agency's capacity to
create rules through a fair and deliberate administrative procedure
59 Id. at 865-66.
66 Id. at 865.
61 Id. at 865-66.
°2
 Id.
" Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
64 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35.
66 Id. at 221-22,225.
56 Id. at 224-25.
67 Id. at 231; see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
68 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27; see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
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appropriate for a credible pronouncement, such as the notice and
comment procedures developed in the APAP According to the Mend
Court, only those regulations that are composed through proper no-
tice and comment procedures or that bear a similar mark from Con-
gress identifying a ruling as deserving respect typically earn the sub-
stantial level of deference found in Chevron."
The Mead Court also refused to assign substantial deference to
the ruling letter because when the Customs Service issued such a
pronouncement, it concerned only the importer and failed to clarify ,
or to define rights or obligations beyond the specific matter at hand. 71
The Customs Service was clear that the issued letters did not bind
third parties.72
 The Customs Service also put all third parties on no-
tice that they could not assume reliance on such letters." The Court
noted that in light of these features, classification rulings of the Cus-
toms Service more closely resembled "'interpretations contained in
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines'"
than the regulations promulgated through a notice and comment
process.74 The Court determined that these attributes indicated that
neither Congress nor the Customs Service intended the letters to
carry the force of law." Therefore, the Court refrained from accord-
ing the agency pronouncement Chevron deference." In going beyond
the precedent set forth in Chevron, the Court in Mead concluded that
interpretive pronouncements of agencies still can be deemed persua-
sive to the degree that they satisfy the requirements that the Court set
forth in Skidmore." The Court reiterated the seminal factors, as de-
scribed in Skidmore, that determine the weight that the Court affords
an agency interpretive rule and noted that they include "'the thor-
oughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
[and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements."'" The
Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in Mead and remanded the case to the lower court because the
Federal Circuit should have applied the Skidmore assessment in tan-
136 Mead, 533 U.S. at 230; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
7° Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31; see 5 U.S.C. § 553; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
71 533 U.S. at 232-33.
"Id. at 233.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 234 (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,587 (2000)).
75 Id. at 231-33.
76 Mead, 533 U.S. at 231; see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
77 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
76 Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
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dem with the Chevron. test." The Mead decision recognized the validity
of the binary Chevron analysis of notice and comment regulations,
while simultaneously lending credence to the multi-factorial measures
of interpretive rulings in Skidmore.8° These cases represent methods of
determining the deference and weight due to federal agency regula-
tions in a manner that will prove essential to understanding the rela-
tionship between these regulations and § 1983 causes of action.°
II. EVOLUTION OF TIME U.S. SUPREME COURT'S § 1983 JURISPRUDENCE
RELATING TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Since its inception in 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has provided a
mechanism for plaintiffs to bring a cause of action for violations of
rights. 82 Although the statute originally conceived of providing reme-
dies only for violations of constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has
included statutory rights as eligible for enforcement under § 1983. 88
The Supreme Court has failed to provide a definitive ruling as to
whether federal regulations can create rights enforceable under
§ 1983.84 Over the past twenty-five years, however, the Court has ad-
dressed many related issues that illuminate the complexities of § 1983
actions and has created seeming ambiguities that have set the stage for
disagreement among the federal circuit courts of appeals over this is-
sue.88
Section 1983 emerged from the first section of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 (the "1871 Act"), a post-Civil War attempt to safeguard the
rights established by the Fourteenth Amendanent.e© Originally, section
1 of the 1871 Act only provided causes of action for the deprivation of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. 87 The
statute, however, underwent a series of revisions that resulted in its
encompassing rights, privileges, and immunities secured by federal
28 Id. at 221, 238-39; sec Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
a° See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
6' See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44; Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301-
03, 312-15; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; infra notes 82-120 and accompanying text.
82 Sec infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
as Sec Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 7 (1980); id. at 15 (Powell, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1874).
84 See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2003).
85 See infra notes 92-120 and accompanying text.
88 ERWIN CIIENIERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.2, at 453-54 (3d ed. 1999); see 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 15 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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laws as well." The provision, § 1983, creates a cause of action against
any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges "rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the U.S. Constitution and laws" of the
United States.89 The statute itself does not create substantive federal
rights." Section 1983, rather, provides a private remedy for the actions
of state officials that result in a deprivation of rights that already are
established by federal law.91
In 1980, in Maine v. Thiboutot, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the Social Security Act established rights that individual plaintiffs may
enforce under § 1983.92 For the first time, the Court applied § 1983 to
the violation of federal statutory rights, whereas previously § 1983 had
only been a remedy for a violation of constitutional rights." To justify
this application of § 1983, the majority opinion dismissed the legisla-
tive history of § 1983 as inconclusive." The Court instead applied a
plain-meaning analysis to conclude that the phrase "and laws" con-
tained within § 1983 should encompass all federal laws." The Court
reasoned that because Congress did not attach any modifying words
to the phrase "and laws," the statute could recognize a claim for viola-
tion of rights created by the Social Security Act." The dissent, how-
ever, contested that the phrase "and laws" was intended to reference
only equal rights legislation that Congress created after the Civil
War.97 The dissenters also feared that the majority's holding could
create an overly broad application of § 1983 to all federal statutes."
A single comment contained within the dissent of justices Stev-
ens, William Brennan, and Harry Blackmun in the 1983 case of
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission of New York provided the first
mention that § 1983 could enforce rights created through regula-
tions, in addition to federal statutes." The dissenters interpreted the
88 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
99 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 936.
5° Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
91 Id.
92 448 U.S. at 4, 9.
93 See id. at 4. For further discussion of previous applications of § 1983, see Todd E. Pet-
tys, The Intended Relationship Between Administrative Regulations and Section 1983's "Laws," 67
Cm. WAsta. L. REv. 51, 52 (1998).
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 7-8.
98 Id. at 4.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 12 (Powell, J„ dissenting).
98 Sec id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
99 See 463 U.S. 582, 638 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority decision in
Guardians did not concern § 1983 or federal regulations, but rather denied compensation
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Court's analysis in Thiboutot to mean that "the § 1983 remedy is in-
tended to redress the deprivation of rights secured by all valid federal
laws, including statutes and regulations having the force of law. ,, iao
The dissenting opinion went on to elaborate that although the Thi-
boutot decision only spoke to federal statutes, "[i] is analysis of § 1983
... applies equally to administrative regulations having the force of
law."1 ° 1 The dissenting justices speculated that regulations that meet
the Chrysler COIL V. Brown test and that have the force of law may cre-
ate rights enforceable under § 1983. 102
In 1987, in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment (if Housing
Authority, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision which has
provided the focal point for the debate among the federal circuit
courts of appeals regarding the use of agency regulations in creating
rights enforceable under § 1983. 105 The strength with which four dis-
senters contested an opinion supported by a terse majority rationale
has fueled the controversy regarding this case and the subsequent dis-
agreement among the federal circuit courts of appeals. 104
In Wright, the parties asked the Court to decide whether a local
housing authority violated both a federal statute by establishing rent
controls and the accompanying implementing regulations to the stat-
ute because the housing authority failed to make reasonable utility
allowances in tenants' rents. 105
 The Court found that Congress had
not intended to preclude plaintiffs from invoking § 1983 under the
Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937 (the "Brooke
Amendment"), which contained implementing regulations in which
the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") estab-
lished rent controls. 106 The Court also dismissed the defendant's
claim that neither the Brooke Amendment nor the implementing
regulations produced rights that plaintiffs could enforce under
§ 1983. 107
 Reasoning that the implementing regulations carry the
force of law under the Chrysler analysis, the Court held that the regu-
to members of a police department that had brought a Title VI suit challenging the city
hiring policy because of the absence of intentional discrimination. Id. at 584.
10 Id. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101 1d. at 638 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
301-03 (1979)).
102 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chrysler, 491 U.S. at 301-03).
w3 5ee979 U.S. 418,431-32 (1987).
'°4 See id. at 438 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); infra notes 121-194 and accompanying text.
nos
	 id. at 419.
I" Id. at 429.
07 Id. at 429-30.
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lations are specific and definite enough to create rights enforceable
under § 1983. 108
The dissenting opinion of four justices in Wright articulated a con-
cern that, under the majority opinion, any agency regulation adopted
within the purview of a statute that contains an enforceable right can
possess enforceable federal rights, even if Congress or the agency never
intended for the regulations to create such rights)" Additionally, the
dissenters were skeptical of the enduring authority of HUD regulations,
which contain the "frequently changing views" of a federal administra-
tive agency, and of the capacity of such regulations to create federal
rights. 110 Although some federal circuit courts of appeals have inter-
preted Wright as holding that a regulation promulgated by a federal
agency can create a right enforceable under § 1983, others have inter-
preted the case as standing for the proposition that regulations are lim-
ited to further defining rights already created by statutes. 111
The Court also has decided cases that articulate requirements
that statutes, and as this Note argues, regulations, must satisfy to be
eligible to create enforceable § 1983 rights. 112 In 1989, in Golden. State
Transit Cmp. v. City of Los Angeles, the U.S. Supreme Court held that to
bring a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of a
specific federal right that Congress intended to benefit a class that
includes the plaintiff." 3 Additionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the rights that are the subject of a § 1983 action are not too vague
to be judicially enforceable.'"
In 1997, in Blessing v. Freestone, the Court further fleshed out the
qualifications for a § 1983 suit as originally laid out in Golden. State. 115
In Blessing, the Court established a three-part test for determining
whether a statute creates an enforceable right that establishes a cause
of action under § 1983:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in ques-
tion benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demon-
strate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so
108 Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32; see supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
'°9 Id. at 438 (O'Connor, J„ dissenting).
II° Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
rat See infra notes 121-194 and accompanying text.
1112 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); Golden State Transit Corp. v.
City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989); infra notes 218-226 and accompanying text.
113 493 U.S. at 106.
I" Id.
115 See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41; Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106.
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"vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain ju-
dicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously
impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the
provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in
mandatory, rather than precatory, terms) 16
There is a rebuttable presumption that a federal statutory right that
meets this three-part test is enforceable under § 1983." 7 Although
rare, such a presumption can be overcome if Congress expressly pro-
hibits use of § 1983 in the statute or implicitly prohibits use by enact-
ing a comprehensive remedial scheme. 118
There are a plethora of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that have
addressed § 1983 generally and cases that have attempted to address
the interplay between regulations and § 1983 with ambiguous re-
sults. 119 The Court, however, has refrained from hearing any cases that
would resolve a debate among the federal circuit courts of appeals as
to whether federal regulations can create rights that individuals may
enforce using § 1983. 120
III. THE CONTROVERSY AMONG FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS
A. Federal Agency Regulations May Create § 1983 Rights
A minority of federal circuit courts of appeals—the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia—have ruled, based upon a broad reading of both Maine v. Thibou-
tot and Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, that
agency regulations independently may create rights enforceable tin-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 121 These two courts of appeals have interpreted
the language of § 1983 that permits remedies for violations of rights
created through laws to include violations of rights derived from
agency regulations. 122
"° 520 U.S. at 340-41 (citations omitted).
" 7 Id. at 341.
119 Id. In 1997, the Supreme Court in Blessing noted that the Court has only twice
found comprehensive remedial schemes that have precluded § 1983 suits. Id. at 347 (citing
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 n.9 (1984); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'tt, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981)).
119 See supra notes 92-118 and accompanying text.
12° See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 936.
121 Sec Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1994); Samuels v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 199-200 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
122 See Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 551; Samuels, 770 F.2d at 199-200.
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In 1985, in Samuels v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit became
the first federal circuit court of appeals to find that agency regulations
may create rights enforceable under § 1983. 125 In Samuels, the court
considered the case of tenants of a housing project that received fed-
eral funds. 124
 The tenants contended that local public housing
officials violated HUD regulations that set forth grievance procedures
and brought a § 1983 action for a violation of rights created by such
regulations. 125 After establishing that. the public housing officials vio-
lated the HUD regulations, the court decided whether the regulations
alone created rights enforceable under § 1983. 126 The HUD regula-
tions possessed the full force and effect of federal law under the Chrys-
ler Corp. v. Brown test because they were "issued under a congressional
directive to implement specific statutory norms and they affect indi-
vidual rights and obligations." 127 The Samuels court cited the Supreme
Court decision in Chrysler, which held that regulations that meet cer-
tain criteria may have the force and effect of laws, as evidence that
such regulations are considered part of federal law. 1213
The court then looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Maine
v. Thiboutot, which interpreted the phrase "and laws" in § 1983 to in-
clude all federal laws, to conclude that the phrase includes federal
regulations "adopted pursuant to a clear congressional mandate that
have the full force and effect of law:125 According to the Samuels
court, the Court in Thiboutot, which held that federal statutory rights
may provide grounds for § 1983 actions, did not intend to limit § 1983
to any particular set of federal laws.'" The court viewed the HUD
regulations as particularly appropriate to create rights enforceable
under § 1983, as they were the result of an explicit congressional di-
rection to HUD that the agency issue such grievance procedure regu-
lations,'" This clear congressional direction to a federal administra-
tive agency to act persuaded the Samuels court to recognize a valid
§ 1983 claim for the violation of HUD regulations.'"
123 See 770 F.2d at 199-200.
124 Id. at 188.
125 Id.
128 Id. at 199-200.
127 Id. at 199.
128 See Samuels, 770 F.2d at 199 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-03
(1979)).
I" Id.
130 Id. (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980)).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 199-200.
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More recent among this tandem of cases, in 1994, in Loschiavo
City of Dearborn, the Sixth Circuit determined that a Federal Commu-
nications Commission ("FCC") regulation possessed the potential to
create a private right enforceable under § 1983. 13 After receiving no-
tice that a recently installed satellite dish antenna in their backyard
was in violation of a local zoning ordinance, the plaintiffs were denied
a variance by a zoning board of appeals and were ordered to remove
the antenna. 134 The plaintiffs brought a claim under § 1983 based on
the FCC regulation that bars the enforcement of zoning ordinances
that unduly interfere with installing satellite dish antennas.'" The
court in Loschiavo cited Might v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous-
ing Authority for the propositions that plaintiffs may use § 1983 to en-
force rights defined by federal statutes, and that federal regulations
can create enforceable rights because they possess the force of law.'"
In Loschiavo, the Sixth Circuit found that the FCC regulation had the
capacity to create rights that are enforceable under § 1983. 137
B. Federal Agencies May Never Independently Create Rights
Enforceable Under § 1983
In contrast, many federal circuit courts of appeals, including the
Third, Fourth, Eleventh, and, most recently, Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals, have held that an agency regulation cannot create an indi-
vidual federal right enforceable through § 1983. 138 Most of these
courts have followed patterns of reasoning similar to the Supreme
Court's § 1983 cases, linking the claimed right with Congress's intent
to create the right.'" As a result, these federal circuit courts of ap-
peals have decided that administrative regulations provide interpreta-
133 33 F.3d at 551-52.
is' Id. at 550.
133 Id.
138 Id. at 551 (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. Hons. Au th., 479 U.S. 418, 431
(1987)).
' 37 Id. at 551-52.
138 Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2003); S. Camden Citi-
zens in Action v. N.J. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 788. 790 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding
that regulations cannot enforce federal rights under § 1983 unless Congress already has
articulated such rights in a statute); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1008, 1009 (11th Cir.
1997) (holding that regulations cannot create federal rights that are not already found in a
statute because regulations do not contain sufficient evidence of congressional intent to
create rights and the Supreme Court's decision in Wright did not assign regulations such
creative authority); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987).
139 See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 936; S. Camden, 274 F.3d at 788; Harris, 127 F.3d at
1008.
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[ions that merely define the content of statutory rights and cannot
create rights enforceable under § 1983 independently. 140
In 1987, in Smith v. Kirk, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals be-
came the first federal circuit court of appeals to rule that federal ad-
ministrative agency regulations cannot create rights enforceable un-
der § 1983. 141
 The court addressed the question of whether a state's
selective determination of disability benefits violates rights created by
a Social Security Administration regulation promulgated under the
Social Security Act. 142
 In determining whether the state action vio-
lated statutory rights, the court first looked to Supreme Court prece-
dent regarding § 1983 to determine that the statute did not create a
right.I 43
 In addressing the issue of rights created through administra-
tive agency regulations, however, the Fourth Circuit held that rights
"not already implicit in the enforcing statute" cannot exist independ-
ently in regulations. 144
 The Fourth Circuit also supported its decision
with the observation that the Supreme Court had refrained from
holding that administrative regulations alone can create rights en-
forceable under § 1983. 145
In 2003, in Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided the most recent entry into this split among
the federal circuit courts of appeals, holding that Title VI administra-
tive regulations cannot independently create rights enforceable
through § 1983. 146 The plaintiffs, a community group in Washington
State, challenged the decision of the regional transit authority to
build a light-rail line through the neighborhoods of the group's
members. 147
 The plaintiffs alleged that the decision violated a De-
partment of Transportation disparate impact regulation that prohibits
actions by recipients of federal funds that burden racial minorities
disproportionately. 148 In this case, the line was proposed to run
through Seattle's Rainier Valley, a neighborhood with a large popula-
tion of racial minorities. 149 The court recognized that whether the
to See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 936; S. Camden, 274 F.3d at 788; Harris, 127 F.3d at
1008.
141 See 821 F.2d at 984.
142 See id. at 982.
143 See id.
144 Id. at 984.
145 Id.
145 See 335 F.3d at 939.
"7 Id. at 934.
148 1d. at 934-35.
149 Id. at 934.
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.Department of Transportation's disparate impact regulation created a
right that is enforceable under § 1983 was predicated upon first de-
termining whether the regulations of a federal agency ever can create
rights enforceable under § 1983. 150
The Save Our Valley court first looked to Supreme Court prece-
dent in the decisions of Alexander v. Sandoval and Gonzaga University v.
Doe because these cases, although not necessarily controlling, con-
tributed insight into how the court should decide this controversial
issue. 151 In 2001, in Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court held that viola-
tions of disparate impact regulations under § 602 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 do not provide individuals with a private cause of ac-
6010 52 Plaintiffs in the case claimed that Title VI and its implement-
ing regulations created a private right that was violated by the Ala-
bama Department of Public Safety's policy of administering driver's
license examinations only in Lnglish. 153 The Court concluded that
because Congress did not intend for Title VI to create a private right
of action for the enforcement of disparate impact regulations, the
Court would not imply a right of action. 154 According to the Ninth
Circuit in Save Our Valley, the Court in Sandoval held that only Con-
gress can create implied rights of action through statutes, meaning
that Congress alone must directly create all individual rights enforce-
able under § 1983.' 55 The Save Our Valley court reasoned that as both
implied rights of action and § 1983 rights are "creatures of federal
substantive law," Congress alone can create such rights because only
Congress has the ability to make laws. 156
The Save Our Valley majority then explored the 2002 decision in
Gonzaga University v. Doe, in which the U.S. Supreme Court, in address-
ing whether spending legislation can create enforceable rights under
§ 1983, provided a rigorous test to determine whether rights generally
are enforceable under § 1983.' 57 The Court in Gonzaga stated that un-
cler § 1983, courts can only enforce "unambiguously conferred
right[s]" that bear the mark of clear congressional intent. 158 The Ninth
15° See id. at 935.
151 See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937 (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002); Sando-
val, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001)).
152 See 532 U.S. at 293.
153
 Id. at 278-79.
151 Id. at 293.
153
 Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937 (citing Sandoua4 532 U.S. at 291).
155 Id.
157 Id. at 938-39; see Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283.
158 536 U.S. at 280, 283.
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Circuit in Save Our Palley maintained that, like Sandoval, the ruling of
the Gonzaga Court suggested that courts should only permit statutes, to
the exclusion of federal agency regulations, to create federal rights. 159
The court in Save Our Valley also found that the Gonzaga decision, like
the decision in Sandoval, inextricably tied together implied rights of ac-
tion with individual rights enforceable under § 1983 because both are
federal substantive law and therefore exist only when "`Congress intended
to create a federal light. "16° The combined reasoning of the Supreme
Court's Sandoval and Gonzaga decisions, in the eyes of the Save Our Valley
court, compelled the conclusion that agency regulations independently
cannot. create individual rights enforceable through § 1983. 161
The Save Our Valley court then assessed the impact of the U.S. Su-
preme Court's decision in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous-
ing Authority, relied upon heavily by the plaintiffs, which held that an
implementing regulation that carries the force of law under the Chrysler
analysis can create a right enforceable under § 1983.162 The Ninth Cir-
cuit in Save Our Willey summarily rejected the plaintiff's assessment of
the Wright decision as standing for the proposition that regulations can
create enforceable rights. 163
 The emphasis that the Wright Court placed
upon congressional intent in enacting the statute, according to the
Ninth Circuit, provided evidence that the Supreme Court was suggest-
ing that the statute, not the regulations, created the right. 164 The Ninth
Circuit also relied upon the dissenting opinion of four justices in Wright,
who observed that the majority never addressed whether agency regula-
tions can create rights enforceable under § 1983. 165 The court main-
tained that the Wright precedent merely allows valid regulations to
define further rights already conferred by statutes. 166
Finally, the Ninth Circuit criticized the decisions of the federal
circuit courts of appeals that have held that regulations can create
individual rights enforceable under § 1983. 167 According to the Save
Our Valley court, the D.C. Circuit in Samuels and the Sixth Circuit in
Loschiavo built their decisions upon the faulty premise that regulations
that have the full force and effect of laws independently have the po-
159 Save Our Valley, 335 F.3(1 at 938 (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283).
'Go Id. (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283).
161 See id. at 939.
162 Id. at 939-40; see Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32; Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301-03.
163 Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 939.
1 " Id.
165 Id. at 940 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 437-38 (O'Connor, J„ dissenting)).
168 Id. at 939.
167 Id. at 942-43.
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tential to create rights enforceable under § 1983. 168 In addition, the
Ninth Circuit pointed out that the Samuels and Loschiavo decisions
predate the Supreme Court's Sandoval and Gonzaga decisions, which
otherwise would compel federal circuit courts of appeals to recognize
the exclusive domain of Congress to create rights enforceable under
§ 1983. 169 After considering Supreme Court and federal circuit courts
of appeals precedents, the Ninth Circuit concluded in Save Our Valley
that "although a regulation may be relevant in determining the scope
of the right conferred by Congress," only statutes can create an indi-
vidual right enforceable under § 1983. 170 Therefore, as Congress
never intended to create an enforceable right for racial minorities to
be free from racially disparate effects in the Department of Transpor-
tation regulations, § 1983 did not apply, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's judgment dismissing the action . 171
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Marsha Berzon stridently dis-
agreed with the sweeping rule established by the majority opinion that
administrative agency regulations never can create rights enforceable
under § 1983, even though she agreed that the Department of Trans-
portation regulations in the case presented to the court did not create
enforceable rights. 172 Judge Berzon began by exploring the nature of
rights as an ordering of relationships and limitations on state actions
that, at times, may be entirely distinct from private judicial remedies.'"
She then criticized the majority opinion for an overly broad reading of
Sandoval and Gonzaga. 174 She disagreed with the majority conclusion
that although Sandoval and Gonzaga speak to the applicability of im-
plied rights of action under § 1983, they also discourage the derivation
of rights from federal administrative agencies that are enforceable tin-
der § 1983. 175 Judge Berzon maintained that the Supreme Court in
Gonzaga failed to determine that Congress maintains exclusive jurisdic-
tion over directly creating rights enforceable under § 1983. 176
166 Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 942-43 (citing Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 551; Samuels, 770
F.2d at 199).
169 Id. at 943.
170 Id.
171 Id, at 944.
172 1d, at 946 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
173 Save Our Talley, 335 F.3d at 946-51 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 952-53 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
176 See id. at 952,954 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 953-54 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (indicating that the separation of powers con-
cern of the Supreme Court in Sandoval, that only Congress should provide access to the
federal courts, does not apply to § 1983 actions because Congress explicitly granted access
to the federal courts by enacting § 1983).
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Judge Berzon's dissent is significant because she concluded that
under the lens of modern administrative law, certain agency regula-
tions should have the capacity to create individual rights."' She criti-
cized the majority decision for interpreting Congress's delegation of
rulemaking authority to federal agencies too formalistically and for
commenting that "'Congress, rather than the executive, is the law-
maker in our democracy.'" 178 The rules that administrative agencies
promulgate either are qualified as interpretive or legislative rules: the
agencies can create the former "independently of any express grant of
power from Congress and without following special procedures,"
while the latter "require an express delegation of rule-making author-
ity from Congress and must be promulgated according to specific
procedures."179 As legislative regulations can bind and impose obliga-
tions on individuals beyond those imposed by statute, they maintain
the character of statutes. 190 Judge Berzon pointed out other features
common to both laws and legislative regulations:
[They] are prescriptive, forward looking, and of general ap-
plicability ... often reflect a careful balance between compet-
ing interests and policy considerations ... "affect individual
rights and obligations" ... [and] are binding on the individu-
als to whom they apply ... can order the relationship between
one individual and another, and they are backed by the coer-
cive power of the government. 181
Judge Berzon's characterizations of federal regulations are consistent
with her position to permit certain agency regulations to create indi-
vidual rights. 182
Judge Berzon then addressed prominent criticisms of agency
regulations by offering functional justifications for the use of agency
regulations in enforcing rights under § 1983. 193 She also pointed out
that although regulations are more numerous and specific than stat-
utes, such characteristics should only reinforce their capacity for cre-
177 See id. at 954 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
178 Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 956 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (quoting majority, id. at 939).
179 Id. at 954 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing RICIIARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 6.4, at 325 (4th ed. 2002)).
193 Id, (Berzon, J„ dissenting) (citing PIERCE, supra note 179, 6.4, at 325).
181 Id. at 954-55 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (quoting Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302 (citations
omitted)).
182 See id. at 954-55 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
188 Save Our Miley, 335 F.3d at 955-56 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
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ating rights. 184 She indicated that although regulations may be more
transient than statutes, the short-lived nature of rights created
through regulations are appropriate for the time and context of their
creation, just as statutory rights are less permanent than constitu-
tional rights and yet appropriate for the context of their creation. 185
According to Judge Berzon, the language of § 1983 produces
ambiguities between the use of the terms "laws" and "statute." 188 She
pointed out that in drafting § 1983, Congress used the phrase "laws"
instead of "statutes" when referring to potential sources for rights en-
forceable under § 1983, even though the word "statute" appears in
the same sentence. 187 Congress's deliberate and separate use of these
terms, in Judge Berzon's evaluation, indicates that Congress did not
intend the term "laws" to include only statutes to the exclusion of
regulations. 188 This inclusive reading of § 1983, as Judge Berzon indi-
cated, also is consistent with the Court's broad interpretation of the
term "laws" in Thiboutot, which first provided that § 1983 should en-
compass all rights derived from federal laws rather than merely consti-
tutional rights. 189
Furthermore, according to Judge Berzon, the majority decision
of the Ninth Circuit in Save Our Palley rested on formalistic thinking
that ignores the Supreme Court's evolving recognition that Congress
has the power to delegate some of its authority to administrative
agencies. 19° She argued that the majority worked from the misguided
premise that a law's ability to create rights is determined solely by its
origin in Congress."' She concluded that this premise has given way
in modern administrative law to a more functional view that recog-
nizes a greater allocation of power to, and independence of, adminis-
trative agencies. 192 She maintained that, subject to appropriate limita-
1 a4 Id. at 955 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 955-56 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 960-61 (Berzon,J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)).
187 Id. at 960 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
188 Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 960 (Berzon, j., dissenting).
199 Id. at 961 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 7).
19' Id. at 956-57 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,
758 (1996) ("This Court established long ago that Congress must be permitted to delegate
to others at least some authority that it could exercise itself."): and Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361,372 (1989) ("t0Jur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical un-
derstanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general directives.")).
191 Id. at 956 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
192 Sec id. at 957 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
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tions, agencies may exercise delegations of authority from Congress to
issue regulations that can create rights, that are binding, and that
have the force and effect of laws. 193
 Judge Berzon concluded that, us-
ing functional principles of modern administrative law, courts should
permit agency regulations to create individual rights, and, therefore,
the majority should not have declared administrative agencies inca-
pable of creating rights enforceable under § 1983 . 194
IV. ANALYSIS: SELECT REGULATIONS SHOULD HAVE THE CAPACITY TO
CREATE § 1983 INTERESTS
As discussed in Part III of this Note, there is a vibrant controversy
among the federal circuit courts of appeals over whether federal ad-
ministrative agency regulations can create rights enforceable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 195
 The absence of controlling U.S. Supreme Court
precedent on this issue and the modern role of federal agencies in
our government should permit an exploration of whether federal
agency regulations can create rights enforceable under § 1983. 198
Those regulations that demonstrate that they can create cognizable
rights, that have the force and effect of law, and that are afforded def-
erence by courts should be eligible to create § 1983 interests. 197
 Addi-
tionally, public policy considerations support the derivation of § 1983
interests from federal regulations. 198
A. The Potential for Regulations to Create § 1983 Interests
To date, there is no evidence of clear congressional intent or con-
trolling Supreme Court precedent that bars the use of administrative
regulations in creating § 1983 interests) 99 Additionally, the significant
position that administrative agencies occupy in our democracy begs a
consideration of regulations as rights-creating pronouncements. 200
195 Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 959 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 946, 954 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
195 See supra notes 121-199 and accompanying text.
196
 See infra notes 199-214 and accompanying text.
197
 See infra notes 215-254 and accompanying text.
198 See infra notes 255-284 and accompanying text.
199 See Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1999); Samuels v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Pettys, supra note 93, at 71 (noting
that the Supreme Court has not indicated whether agency regulations may create rights
under § 1983 and that the Court has provided little more than vague signals as to how the
controversy should be resolved).
200 See Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under I 1983T: A Theo-
retical Approach, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 163, 165 (2003) (asserting that principles of modern
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Congressional intent regarding the role that administrative regu-
lations should play in § 1983 actions is ambiguous, as the legislative
history behind § 1983 is unclear. 201 As Judge Berzon pointed out in
her dissent to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals's Save Our Valley v.
Sound Transit decision, which held that federal regulations cannot
create § 1983 interests, the language of § 1983 produces ambiguities
between the use of the terms "laws" and "statutes" in a way that casts
doubt about congressional intent. 202 Despite the holdings in Alexander
v. Sandoval, that violations of disparate impact regulations do not pro-
vide private causes of action, and in Gonzaga University v. Doe, that un-
der § 1983 courts can only enforce an unambiguously conferred right
that bears the mark of clear congressional intent, the Supreme Court
has refrained from ruling on whether federal agency regulations can
create § 1983 interests. 203
 Although some courts may construe the
Sandoval and Gonzaga decisions broadly to prohibit the use of federal
agency regulations to create § 1983 interests, the courts should read
the holdings of these decisions with greater specificity to concern only
implied rights of action. 2" Such a reading properly places these
precedents outside the scope of the current controversy among the
federal circuit courts of appeals.20
 The absence of clear congressional
intent and controlling Supreme Court precedent creates the potential
for competing perspectives in determining whether federal agency
regulations create § 1983 interests. 2" If not expressly prohibited by
administrative law and federalism support the use of regulations in § 1983 suits); Melissa A.
Hoffer, Closing the Door on Private Enforcement of Title VI and EPA's Discriminatory Effects Regu-
lations: Strategies for Environmental Justice Stakeholders After Sandoval and Gonzaga, 38 NEw
ENG. L. Itcv. 971, 995, 996 (2004) (maintaining that the Supreme Court's administrative
law decisions suggest that regulations should be eligible to create rights enforceable under
§ 1983); infra notes 208-214 and accompanying text.
2° 1 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7 (1980).
2°2 335 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2003); id. at 960-61 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)); infra notes 186-189 and accompanying text.
2° 3 Sec Gonzaga Univ. V, Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280, 283 (2002); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
204 See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 952, 954 (Berzon, J., dissenting). Compare Hoffer, su-
pra note 200, at 994, 995 (arguing that the Supreme Court's implied right of action analy-
sis should not be overextended to determine whether federal regulations can create rights
enforceable under § 1983), with Bradford C. Mank, Suing Under § 1983: The Future After
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 39 Hous. L. Riot. 1417, 1461, 1467 (2003) (asserting that, in
light of Gonzaga, the Supreme Court would be unlikely to find that regulations could
evince the requisite congressional intent to establish rights under § 1983, although regula-
tions still may be able to further develop a right already created by statute).
295 See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 952, 954 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
206 See Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 551; Samuels, 770 F.2d at 199.
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Congress, regulations, in some circumstances, should be eligible to
create § 1983 interests due to the ubiquitous modern use of federal
regulations and a functional need for the creation of such interests. 207
As Judge Berzon observed, the majority decision in Save Our Wil-
ley illustrated a formalistic approach to Congress's delegation of
rulemaking authority to federal agencies when the majority com-
mented that "'Congress, rather than the executive, is the lawmaker in
our democracy.'"208 This perspective not only expresses reservation
about the basic function of agencies issuing rules, but also underlies
the hesitancy of many federal circuit courts of appeals to recognize
that administrative agency regulations; as a class, contain the capacity
to create rights enforceable under § 1983. 209 The Supreme Court and
constitutional scholars, however, have recognized that the existence
and function of modern administrative agencies are constitutionally
valid and necessary for the efficient operation of our highly regulated
society. 2" In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. held that administrative agencies
exercise their proper function when courts permit them to formulate
policies and to create rules that "'fill any gap left, implicitly or explic-
itly, by Congress."2" Therefore, the Supreme Court has expressed an
observation that contradicts the image of Congress as sole author of
authoritative pronouncements. 212 By recognizing that courts should
be highly deferential to agencies' interpretations of statutes, the
Court in Chevron placed a great deal of authority in agencies to craft
regulations that courts should recognize as possessing controlling
weight and respect in interpreting a statute. 20 The frequency with
which Congress currently leaves either explicit or implicit gaps for
"7 See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 957 (Berzon, J.. dissenting); Cynthia R. Farina, Statu-
tory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Comm. L. REv. 452,
487 (1989) (suggesting that a flexible delegation of powers among the branches of gov-
ernment and functional administrative state has been necessary for an increasingly com-
plex society).
208
 335 F.3d at 956 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (quoting majority, id. at 939).
2" See id. (Berzon, J., dissenting).
210 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 372 (1989); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984); Farina, supra note 207, at 487.
211 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)),
212 See id. at 842-44. But see Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 939.
213 See 467 U.S. at 842-44.
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agencies to fill in with regulatory schemes indicates the significant
authority that agency regulations collectively possess. 214
B. Criteria to Permit Regulations to Create § 1983 Interests
If courts allow federal regulations to create rights under § 1983,
courts must apply a myriad of stringent tests to regulations to identify
those that are eligible to create such rights. 215
 Therefore, a regulation
that can create a § 1983 interest should create a judicially cognizable
right and carry the force and effect of law by adhering to APA proce-
dural requirements. 216 Such a regulation also should possess control-
ling weight by satisfying the binary test established in Chevron and the
multi-factorial measure introduced in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.2 t 7
To be eligible to create a federal right that plaintiffs may assert
under § 1983, a regulation first should create a judicially cognizable
right using the criteria articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bless-
ing v. Freestone, which established a three-part test for determining
whether a statute creates a § 1983 interest. 218 Although the Court in
Blessing applied the criteria to determine whether a statute may provide
grounds for a § 1983 claim, these criteria also could serve as a credible
measurement of whether a regulation could provide similar grounds. 219
In applying the Blessing criteria, a regulation first must reflect
congressional intent to create a benefit for the plaintiff. 220
 A regula-
tion may reflect congressional intent to benefit a plaintiff if, for ex-
ample, it creates an individualized entitlement or confers a direct
benefit on a plaintiff rather than merely having an impact on a larger
2" See id. at 843; JERRY L. MAsitAw, GREED, CIIAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE '110 IMPROVE PUBLIC Lim 152 (1997) (arguing that because it is more costly for
Congress to legislate than it is for federal agencies to promulgate regulations, the rulemak-
ing function of the administrative state is necessary).
215 Sec 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); United States s Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35
(2001); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44;
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-03, 312-15 (1979); Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 190 (1M).
216 See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Mead, 533 U.S. at 239-35; Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41; Chrysler,
441 U.S. at 301-03, 312-15; Pettys, supra note 93, at 81 (observing that no federal circuit
court of appeals has employed both the Chrysler force and effect of law test in tandem with
the three-part Blessinganalysis in discerning whether regulations can create rights enforce-
able under § 1983).
217 See Chevron, 967 U.S. at 842-49; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
218 See 520 U.S. at 340-91.
2 I 9 See id.
220 See id. at 340.
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system and an indirect benefit on an individual. 221 Second, the right
created by a regulation cannot be too "'vague and amorphous'" for a
court to enforce. 222 A court would consider a regulation too vague or
amorphous if it contained ambiguous terms without providing any
guidance as to how to interpret these terms. 223 Finally, a regulation
must be mandatory and impose an obligation on the states. 224 For ex-
ample, a regulation that cannot command a non-complying state to
take any remedial action would not be a mandatory provision. 225 If a
regulation possesses all three of these qualities, it should be able to
create a right that a court can enforce. 22°
If a regulation can create a judicially cognizable right, courts
should consider the weight of the regulation and the deference due
to its interpretations in determining whether it can create a right en-
forceable under § 1983. 227 The Court in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown offered
a test to determine whether regulations possess the force of law that
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has used to evaluate
whether regulations can create § 1983 interests. 228 The Court in Chrys-
ler differentiated between substantive rules that possess the force and
effect of law and interpretive rules that agencies have not issued
through notice and comment rulemaking in a manner that could
provide guidance in assessing their capacity to create § 1983 inter-
ests. 223 Substantive rules should carry sufficient weight to be eligible
to create § 1983 interests as they "'affect individual rights and obliga-
tions'" and are sufficiently binding to carry the force of law. 23° The
Chrysler requirements that a congressional grant of authority author-
ize the promulgating agency to issue substantive regulations and that
the agency follow congressional procedural requirements when issu-
ing such regulations also can provide guidance in determining the
eligibility of regulations to create § 1983 in terests. 231
221 See id. at 343-45.
222 See id. at 340-41 (quoting Wright v. City of Roanoke Redo:. & lious. Au th., 479 U.S.
418,431-32 (1987)).
223 See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 345.
224 See id. at 341.
224 See id. at 344.
226 See id. at 340-41.
227 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41;
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44; Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301-03, 312-15; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
228 See 441 U.S. at 301-03, 312-15; Samuels, 770 F.2d at 199.
229 See 441 U.S. at 301-03,312-15.
238 See id. at 301-02 (quoting Morton, 415 U.S. at 232).
281 See id. at 302-03.
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At leaSt one federal circuit court of appeals has not permitted
agency regulations to create rights enforceable under § 1983 because of
a lack of evidence that Congress ever intended for regulations to pos-
sess this characteristic. 252 Congressional intent that agencies create
regulations possessing the force of law, however, is evident in those
regulations created pursuant to the APA. 233 Congress must authorize an
agency to promulgate notice and comment regulations, according to
the APA, through a grant of authority in crafting an agency's organic
statute—the law through which Congress establishes an administrative
agency. 234 Therefore, if an agency creates a regulation pursuant to the
notice and comment procedural requirements of the APA, there is evi-
dence of congressional intent for the promulgating agency to compose
rules that have the force and effect of law. 235 In contrast, interpretive
rules, such as the U.S. Customs Service's pronouncements in United
States v. Mead cmp., which reiterated the Skidmore measure of deference
that courts should grant interpretive rules, are not subject to the APA
requirements of notice and comment procedures. 238 Congress need not
grant permission for an agency to promulgate interpretive rules. 237
Therefore, interpretive rules are unsuitable for creating rights enforce-
able under § 1983.258 The difference between regulations created ac-
cording to notice and comment rulemaking and regulations created
outside of such procedural requirements suggests that the former
should exert greater force than the latter. 239 Thus, if an agency regula-
tion carries the force and effect of law under the Chrysler analysis, par-
ticularly if it is the product of notice and comment rulemaking under
the APA, courts should give that regulation further consideration as to
whether it can create a right enforceable tinder § 1983.240
Finally, by examining those regulations that are qualified to fill
statutory gaps, the degree of deference accorded to a regulation's in-
terpretations under both Chevron and Skidmore also can provide sound
guidance in determining whether that regulation can create rights
enforceable under § 1983. 241
 The extent to which courts defer to an
232 See Save On r Valley, 335 F.3d at 939,940.
233 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 312-13.
234 5 U.S.C. § 553; BLACK 'S LAW DtcrioNARy 1421 (7th ed. 1999).
233 See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
236 See id.; Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35.
237 See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Mead, 533 U.S. at 230; Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 313-16.
238 See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Mead, 533 U.S. at 230; Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 313-16.
239 See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
218 Sec id.; Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 313.
241 Sec Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
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agency's interpretations of a regulation does not control whether
courts must accept a regulation as creating rights enforceable under
§ 1983. 242 The criteria that the Supreme Court in Chevron and Skidmore
used in determining the extent of judicial deference due to agency
interpretations of statutes, however, reveals both the manner in which
the Supreme Court permits qualified agency regulations authorita-
tively to fill the gaps left by statutes and the characteristics that such
regulations must possess. 243 If certain regulations can fill gaps where
Congress has not spoken through statute, these regulations should
have the ability to create rights based on a reasonable interpretation
of the statute that the regulation is designed to 0.244 Chevron's hold-
ing—that agency regulations that offer a permissible construction of a
statute carry authoritative interpretations of the statute—supports the
creation of regulatory rights, in accordance with the statute, that are
enforceable under § 1983.245
Nevertheless, courts may criticize the "reasonable interpretation"
measure by which Chevron determines the degree of deference due to
regulations as insufficiently demanding if used alone to determine
§ 1983 eligibility by courts that are hesitant to invest such creative
force behind regulations.246 A more comprehensive test, as articulated
in Skidmore and recently reaffirmed by the Court in Mead, although
typically applied to interpretive rules, should work in tandem with the
binary Cheuron test to determine whether notice and comment regula-
tions can create § 1983 interests. 247 Despite its intended use for inter-
pretive rules rather than notice and comment regulations, the Skid-
more test implemented in the context of creating § 1983 rights
provides a second step to the Chevron test and a more thorough ex-
amination of agency regulations. 248 In order to possess the authority
necessary to create a § 1983 interest, a regulation first should be the
product of thorough agency consideration. 249 The most common ex-
ample of such a regulation could be the product of notice and com-
ment rulemaking under the APA. 25° A regulation also should be the
product of agency experience and expertise to be considered eligible
242 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
243 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
244 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
243 See 967 U.S. at 842-44.
246 See id.; see also, e.g., Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 939.
247 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
246 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Chevron, 467 U,S. at 842-44; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
249 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 235; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
25° See s U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
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to create a § 1983 interest."' Filially, to merit consideration, a regula-
tion should have a substantial degree of consistency with both prior
and subsequent regulations issued by the agency. 252
 Regulations that
give rise to rights enforceable under § 1983 should be visibly part of
some logical patchwork of rules that an agency has issued over time. 253
These criteria, when coupled with the Chevron standard and proce-
dural requirements of the APA, recognize the important function of
federal regulations while still Scrupulously examining the nature of
the right, the weight of the regulation, and the intent of Congress in
granting authority for agencies to issue regulations. 254
C. Public Policy Arguments Supporting Regulations' Creation of § 1983 Intemsts
Courts may be reluctant to entertain federal regulations as the
source of rights enforceable under § 1983 due to public policy con-
cerns. 255 Although such policy concerns are not without foundation, a
broader consideration of the purpose of § 1983 and the nature of
federal regulations reveals public policy considerations that bolster,
rather than refute, the proposition that regulations can create rights
enforceable under § 1983. 256
Some courts may contend that it would be inefficient to recognize
federal regulations as creating rights enforceable under § 1983 because
of the abundance of regulations that would be eligible and the excessive
manner in which these numerous claims would consume judicial re-
sources. 257 Recognizing regulations as a source of rights enforceable un-
der § 1983 undoubtedly would increase the number of claims brought
under the statute. 258
 The expense of increased claims, however, should
not be a significant consideration in this determination, as § 1983 is de-
251 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
252 Sec Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
255 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
254
 See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41; Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842-44; Chrysler; 441 U.S. at 301-03, 312-15; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 190.
255 See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 955-56•(Berzon, J., dissenting); infra notes 257-284
and accompanying text.
256 See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 955-,56 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
257 See id, at 955 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
256 See id. (Berzon, J., dissenting); Charles Davant IV, Sorcerer or Sorcerer's Apprentice?: Fed-
eral Agencies and the Creation of Individual Rights, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 613,640 (asserting that if
regulations could create rights enforceable under § 1983, federal courts would be bur-
dened with an excessive volume of such claims); Keith E. Eastland, Environmental Justice
and the Spending Power: Limits on Using Title W and § 1983, 77 MITRE DAmE, L. REV. 1601,
1615 (2002) (concluding that the use of federal regulations to create rights enforceable
under § 1983 would increase federal litigation substantially).
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signed to safeguard the rights of the individual from abusive state ac-
tions. 259 As a result, courts should permit plaintiffs to assert § 1983 claims
liberally, and an abundance of claims is a signal of achieving our demo-
cratic goal of preserving the rights and interests of the minority.26°
In light of the concern of judicial efficiency that some courts may
maintain, accepting regulations as creating § 1983 interests still will
not cause an undue strain on the judicial systern. 261 An increase in
§ 1983 suits grounded in rights from federal regulations would be
similar in scope to the increase of suits that resulted after the expan-
sion of § 1983 by the holding of the Supreme Court in Maine v. Thi-
boutoi to encompass statutory rights in addition to constitutional
rights.262 Moreover, if statutes provided the only grounds for § 1983
interests, there is a substantial risk that. the efficiency of the entire
rulemaking system could be in jeopardy. 265 Universally ignoring those
§ 1983 interests created by regulatory rights would threaten the le-
gitimacy and authority of federal regulations as a class. 264 As one of
the central functions of agency regulations is to fill the gaps left open
by Congress, the erosion of regulatory authority necessarily would re-
sult in an increased reliance on statutory authority and heightened
strain on congressional resources,265 If Congress were less able to
delegate authority to administrative agencies,. the current system of
delegating rulemaking authority would be rendered less efficient. 266
Although some courts maintain that regulations should not cre-
ate § 1983 interests because they are more transient than statutes, the
transience of federal regulations does not render them less valid or
inadequate to create rights. 267 Courts consider regulations more tran-
sitory than statutes because federal agencies create and terminate
regulations with greater ease than when Congress promulgates stat-
utes. 268 The potentially brief lifespan of federal regulations, however,
255 See 42	 § 1983 (2000); CHEM ERINSKY, supra note 86, § 8.2, at 453-54.
265 Sec 42 U.S.C. § 1983; CIIEM ER INSKY, supra note 86, § 8.2, at 453-54.
261 See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4.
262 See id.





267 See Wright, 479 U.S. at 438 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at
940; id. at 955-56 (Berzon, J., dissenting); Eastland, supra note 258, at 1615, 1644 (arguing.
in the context of Title VI disparate impact regulations, that transient agency regulations
are unfit to create federal rights).
266 Sec Wright 479 U.S. at 438 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at
940; id. at 955 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
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should not render them unable to create rights.269 As Judge Berzon
pointed out in her dissenting opinion in Save Our Valley, it is uncertain
why relatively short-lived rights created by federal regulations are ob-
jectionable, as they are no less valid during their existence, even if
brief.2" Just as regulations impose short-lived obligations on individu-
als, they should likewise be able to create equally transient rights.27i
Moreover, as Judge Berzon argued, the transience of regulations can
only be defined in relative terms.272 Although the nature of regulatory
rights may be more short-lived than those of statutes, statutory rights
are far more transient than the immutable rights found in the U.S.
Constitution. 2" Nonetheless, courts have deemed statutory rights en-
forceable under § 1983, just as regulatory rights should be.274
Although some courts may be hesitant to permit regulations to
create § 1983 interests because the public cannot hold administrative
agencies, unlike Congress, politically accountable for their actions, the
President remains ultimately accountable as executive of all federal
agencies. 2" The Supreme Court in Cheuron justified its decision to ac-
cord substantial deference to agency interpretations of a statute by re-
futing the argument that agencies are unaccountable. 2" In Chevron, the
Court maintained that the President, as head administrator, remains
politically accountable for the entire system of federal administrative
agencies and is entitled to make policy choices to resolve conflicting
interests of Congress.277 This same direct chain of responsibility is
equally applicable to regulations in their rights-creating capacity. 2"
Filially, some courts may object to the use of regulations as grounds
for § 1983 suits because regulations are insufficiently authoritative or
binding.2" As Judge Berzon indicated, however, regulations contain the
289 See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 955-56 (Berzon. J., dissenting).
276
	 at 955 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
27 ' Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting).
272 Id. at 955-56 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
273 Id. (Berzon, J., dissenting).
274 See Tltiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4; Save Our Valicy, 335 F.3d 955-56 (Berzon J., dissenting).
270 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; Davant, supra note 258, at 639, 640 (maintaining
that, compared to acts of Congress, federal agencies are less accountable to the states and
their policy decisions are not subject to the same rigorous examination by multiple
branches of government).
278




279 See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 954-55 (Berzon, J., dissenting); Pettys, supra note 93,
at 96-99 (indicating that Congress intended a sharp divide between the authority of regu-
lations and statutes as demonstrated by the inability of regulations to create obligations
that impose criminal penalties or confer vested employment rights).
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same properties as statutes because they are binding on individuals, as
well as on branches of government, and contain the same form and ef-
fect as statutes. 280 Regulations, like statutes, are also "prescriptive, for-
ward-looking, and of general applicability." 281
 Additionally, regulations
are only inferior to statutes in that they must conform to, and cannot be
an arbitrary or capricious expression of, the authority that statutes give
them. 282
 Valid regulations are no less legitimate or authoritative than
statutes. 283
 The manner in which courts examine regulations to be a
proper exercise of authority, coupled with the proposed judicial tests
mentioned earlier in this Note, should help courts identify those regula-
lions that create valid rights enforceable under § 1983. 234
CONCLUSION
Courts should resolve the conflict among the federal circuit
courts of appeals regarding whether federal administrative agency
regulations can create § 1983 interests by selectively allowing certain
regulations to create such interests. When taken together, the rights-
creation test of Blessing v. Freestone, the full-force-of-law measure of
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, the binary criteria of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and multi-factorial criteria of
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. produce a battery of thorough evaluations that
should guide courts in permitting certain regulations to create § 1983
interests. Such a thorough evaluation should assuage the concerns of
those courts that are hesitant to permit regulations to provide rights
enforceable under § 1983. The benefit of providing individuals with a
cause of action to preserve their regulatory rights against abusive ac-
tions of state actors outweighs opposing public policy concerns. Addi-
tionally, permitting federal regulations to create § 1983 interests
should be reflective of, and necessary in light of, the increased
authority and deference that Congress and the judiciary accord to
regulations.
JOHN A. MCBRINE
24° Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 955 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
28t Id. at 954 (Berzon, J., dissenting); see s U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000) (defining 'rule").
282 See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 955 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2) (A), (C)).
283 See id. (Berzon, J., dissenting).
284 See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35; Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41; Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842-44; Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301-03, 312-15; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; supra
notes 215-254 and accompanying text.
